Learning theoretic aspects of mathematics and logic have been studied by many authors. They study how mathematical and logical objects are algorithmically \learned" (inferred) from nite data. Although they study mathematical objects, the objective of the studies is learning. In this paper, a mathematics of which foundation itself is learning theoretic will be introduced. It is called Limit-Computable Mathematics. I t w as originally introduced as a means for \Proof Animation," which is expected to make i n teractive formal proof development easier. Although the original objective w as not learning theoretic at all, learning theory is indispensable for our research. It suggests that logic and learning theory are related in a still unknown but deep new way.
In Shaprio's work, the concepts of validity a n d models are the standard ones from Tarskian semantics, and learning of axiom systems in Horn-logic from models is investigated. On the other hand, we g i v e semantics of the rst order formulas by means of \learnability". For example, 9y: A(x y), which reads as \there exists y satisfying A(x y)", is interpreted as \the value of y satisfying A(x y) is learnable from the value of x".
What does \y is learnable from the value of x" mean? It means that we have a learning algorithm to produce an answer according to a learning theoretic framework. There are several di erent frameworks of learning theory, such as inductive inference (incremental learning) and PAC-learning. They are further classi ed into subframeworks such as BC-learning and EX-learning.
If we x one of such learning theory frameworks, then we can de ne a new \logic". It may not be a proper logic. We can de ne a kind of semantics for it, that is, an interpretation of propositions, but it may n o t b e e v en closed under expected logical rules such as modus ponens. In this paper, our learning theoretic frameworks are restricted to incremental learning, namely, inductive inference or identi cation in the limit.
So far, incremental learning is the only good framework for logic. We have found that subframeworks such as EX-learning and BC-learning have slightly di erent meaningful logics. A new learning theoretic framework \Popperian game" has been found through an investigation of relationship between our mathematics and reverse mathematics 28].
So far we do not know the whole picture of the links between logic and learning theory. Many fundamental questions have not been answered. We do not even know if there are logics corresponding to frameworks beyond incremental learning such as PAC-learning. Nonetheless, my thesis is that learning theory and logic are related much more deeply than we n o w think. In this largely expository paper, I will explain known relationships between the rules of classical logic and incremental learning, which are the bases of my conviction.
Objectives and backgrounds
The real goal of Limit-Computable Mathematics, abbreviated to LCM, is a methodology of testing and debugging formal proofs introduced in 16]. I will brie y explain the background of the research below. A more technically detailed exposition of objectives and backgrounds can befound in 15].
Our mathematics was found through an investigation of interactive formal proof developments. The area is mainly known by the names of proof check-ers such as NQTHM, HOL PVS, COQ,. . . . It may be regarded as a branch of the broad area of formal methods, which aims to utilize formal languages, formal semantics, and formal proofs for developments of software and hardware systems. Formal veri cation, formal speci cations, model checking are all branches of the formal methods, and formal proof development is a basic technology for the entire area.
In the mid 80's formal methods community realized importance of validation of formal speci cations. In the formal veri cation project of the 8-bits Viper chip for military and other safety-critical uses, it was found that errors in large scale speci cations are much more serious than had been anticipated and that the ultimate way to detect them must be somehow informal. Ultimate requirements of systems are in human minds. They are often unclear and even unstable. Vague informal things cannot be veri ed in a formal way. Thus, informal things must be translated into formal things. However, the errors may be in the translation of informal things into formal things. Thus, informal and empirical methodologies are important e v en in formal methods.
I found similar di culties in formal proof developments in my own project. Goals and subgoals (lemmas), and de nitions of concepts could be formalized in wrong ways. There was no formal way to detect the wrong formalizations. However, I found that testing formal proofs under development is an extremely e cient w ay to detect such errors on translation of informal things to formal things. The PX proof system 14], which was designed to extract \certi ed" functional programs from formal proofs, could extract programs nely representing computational contents of intuitionistic proofs. By testing such programs in the usual sense, errors in de nitions and lemmas (subgoals) in the formal proofs were quickly detected. Since the technique is similar to a formal method technique \speci cation animation" testing speci cation on examples, I called it proof animation, abbreviated to PA. I proposed to use proof animation to make formal proof developments less costly in 16] . Since the method was applicable only to intuitionistic proofs, I had to nd a method applicable to classical proofs. Berardi's semantics 8] approximating classical proofs by nitely restricted version of the proofs was a possible candidate. Just by c hance, I found that Berardi's examples are very similar to Hilbert's original reasoning of his famous nite basis theorem proved in the late 19th century (see 15] for details). Akihiro Yamamoto pointed out to me that both are the same as the limit notions in learning theory. After Yamamoto's suggestion, I found that \computation in the limit" or \limiting recursion" corresponds to restricted forms of classical principles such as the law of excluded middle applied to an arithmetical formula with a single quanti er, e.g., 0 1 -formulas, and learning theoretic notions are very useful for proof animation.
I will refer to these restricted principles as \semi-classical principles". Logicians including myself tend to think that the limit-recursive functions and semi-classical principles would not make a g o o d l o g i c . T h e y look so fragmentary. At rst, I doubted even its closure under the usual inference rules of constructive logic. Even S. Feferman, one of the most notable logicians of the present time, had the same impression.
However, to my surprise, the logic de ned by limiting recursion was very natural, and remarkably wide realms of mathematical proofs were found to use only these weak classical principles instead of the full power of classical principles. Thus, it seemed possible to develop most formal proofs only with semi-classical principles and animate them by computation in the limit. Since it is based on the limit, I named such a mathematics Limit-Computable Mathematics, LCM.
To built LCM-tools for formal proof developments, there are some theoretical questions to be solved. The standard limit notations are not adequate to represent limit-structures of proofs, and so a concurrent calculus of limit processes must be de ned and implemented as a kind of programming language. It is not known if impredicative reasonings have LCM-interpretations. Is it possible to extend the proof animation by limit beyond LCM? 2 There are some important and interesting theoretical questions to be solved to build realistic LCM-environments.
LCM is also interesting as a b r a n c h of pure mathematics. It seems related to recursion theory, to reverse mathematics 28], to game semantics 12] and even to computation theories over real numbers 21, 31] . For example, in this paper, we will sketch an interesting relationship of a very weak principle of excluded middle to weak K onig's Lemma in reverse mathematics and the relationship is maintained by a sort of learning by erasing wrong hypotheses.
Semantics
In this section, we explain LCM by giving its informal semantics A formal semantics is given in the appendix. The semantics of LCM given below is a variant of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK interpretation) of intuitionistic mathematics. In the early 20th century, a famed mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer attacked usage of the traditional Aristotelian logic in mathematics. He attacked especially the law of the excluded middle A _ : A.
Since he interpreted \A or B" as \there is an algorithm deciding A or B", the 2 Berardi is extending his limit-semantics 9] to 0 n -reasonings. His results suggest that there might b e a w ay to animate proofs by the law of excluded middle applied to any arithmetical formula. law was the same to him as saying \all mathematical problems are decidable by a universal algorithm". Thus, he rejected it and created a mathematics which did not employ such principles. He called his mathematics intuitionistic mathematics and the usual mathematics was called classical mathematics. 3 Morphologically, i n tuitionistic mathematics is a subset of classical mathematics in which the law of excluded middle and its equivalents are forbidden. Brouwer had a philosophical reason to reject the law, and to guarantee correctness of other rules. However, his philosophical principle was rather subjective, mysterious and unclear for the rational minds of most mathematicians and logicians.
Later, Heyting and Kolmogorov g a ve a m uch clearer and objective i n terpretation for Brouwer's mathematics without Brouwer's philosophy. The interpretation is now called BHK-interpretation. Although BHK-interpretation was much clearer, it was still somehow unclear since the unde ned notion of \con-struction" was employed and the semantics was explained in informal languages. To make it ultimately clear, Kleene replaced \constructions" with partial recursive functions and gave a translation of a formula into a formula representing his version of BHK-interpretation. Kleene named it \realizability interpretation". Introductory accounts of BHK-interpretation and realizabilities are found in 6,10,30].
Our semantics of LCM given below is obtained from BHK-interpretation by replacing constructions with limiting recursive functions. It will be called limit-BHK-interpretation. Since BHK-interpretation is rather informal, there are many di erent ways to make it formal. Formal versions can bedi erent to each other in some essential ways. The informal semantics (limit-BHKinterpretation) may be regarded as a guideline or a framework such as object oriented modeling paradigm. Thus, it does not specify the details of the semantics. Details must be given by a formal semantics like realizability i n terpretations, which correspond to actual object oriented programming languages such as Java, C++. Now w e give limit-BHK interpretation of mathematics. We will describe what rst order logical formulas of the forms, 9x:A(x), 8x:A(x), A_B, A^B, A ) B mean in limit-BHK interpretation for each case. The crucial cases are A _ B and 9x:A(x). Brouwer regarded correctness of A _ B as the ability to decide which o f A and B is correct and to prove the correct one. "For example, let A denote the statement \ZF-set theory is consistent" and B denote the statement \ZF-set theory is inconsistent". Then the statement A_B holds if we can nd out which statement C 2 fA Bg is true and we furthermore give a proof of the correctness of C. Since consistency of a formal system is a 0 1 -statement, 3 Intuitionistic mathematics have many variants. Among these variants are constructive mathematics and Brouwer's mathematics 10].
there is no general algorithm to decide it and G odel's incompleteness theorem tells us that it is impossible to assert one of them by a reasonable method, even if we believe in the consistency.
In limit-BHK interpretation, the obligation to \decide" A or B is relaxed to \learn" A or B. W e s a y A_B is correct in the sense of limit-BHK interpretation i we have a computable guessing function g(t) s u c h that (1) g(t) converges to 0 or 1, (2) if lim t g(t) = 0 t h e n , A is correct in limit-BHK-sense, (3) if lim t g(t) = 1 t h e n , B is correct in limit-BHK-sense.
1 if a proof of a code smaller than t derives a contradiction 0 otherwise
Obviously g satis es the three conditions above. Thus, the law of the excluded middle applied to the consistency of ZF-set theory is correct in the sense of limit-BHK-interpretation.
Remark 1 Assume that g is a guessing function of some function h. How does this h look like? A guessing function of an n-ary function is n + 1 -ary. Since g is unary, it is a guessing function of a 0-ary function h. That is, h satis es h() = x for some x. Although a guessing function of a 0-ary function seems to be rare in learning theory, it is quite useful in LCM.
Note that we need the law of excluded middle to prove the convergence of g.
Thus, this does not help to decide if the system is consistent or not at all. 4 \ZF-set theory is consistent or not in limit-BHK-interpretation" means that consistency of ZF-set theory is computable in the limit. Since we cannot compute the limit in Turing's sense, this does not help to understand consistency of formal systems anyway.
However, limit-BHK-interpretation gives a systematic way to approximate a non-computable truth by a guessing function. The approximation given by a guessing function helps to understand computational contents of a class of noncomputational or non-constructive proofs. It was the original aim of my proof animation technique to give a method by w h i c h classical proofs in mathematics are computationally analyzable through actual execution. Although LCMproofs cannot be executed in Turing's sense, they are approximately executable by guessing functions. And, such approximate executions are adequate for proof animation as discussed in section 5. Similarly, asserting the existential statement \9x:A(x)" is interpreted to give its guessing function g(t) w i t h t h e following conditions:
(1) g(t) is a pair (g 1 (t) g 2 (t)) and g(t) c o n verges as t ! 1 , (2) g 2 is a guessing function of A(m), where m = l i m t g 1 (t).
Asserting an existential or disjunctive formula means giving a guessing function by which we can compute in the limit the information on the existential quanti er \x of 9x:A(x) and information for A(x)" or on disjunction \the correct disjunct of A _ B and information for the disjunct". Such a guessing function will be called a guessing function of the statement. In general, giving a limit-BHK-interpretation to a formula is de ning the conditions of the guessing functions for the formula. When a guessing function satisfying the conditions exists, the formula is valid or correct in limit-BHK-interpretation. Such a formula will be said to belimit-BHK-correct for short.
The conditions on a guessing function g of a conjunctive statement A^B is given as follows:
(1) g(t) is a pair (g 1 (t) g 2 (t)), (2) g 1 is a guessing function of A and g 2 is a guessing function of B.
The condition of a guessing function g(x t) of a universal statement 8x:A(x) is g(x t) c o n verges to a guessing function of A(x) for all x.
Similarly the condition of a guessing function g(x t) o f A ) B is if f is a guessing function of A, t h e n g(f t) converges to a guessing function of B.
The conditions for the universal quanti er and the implication are somehow problematic, since limits of guessing functions are again guessing functions. There are two major di erent approaches on functions incidentally corresponding to the approaches to functions in EX-learnability a n d BC-learnability.
In his original interpretation, Kleene treated functions as \programs" or \in-dices" as EX-learnability. This approach is called intensional. Kreisel's modied realizability i n terpretation can treat functions as their extensions as in the usual set theoretical mathematics, i.e., two functions are equal i their graphs are equal. This approach is called extensional and apparently corresponds to BC-learnability b y Case and Smith. Kleene-style intensional interpretation is given in the appendix. A realizability using extensional approach is possible by the construction in 2] Finally, w e give i n terpretation of non-logical formulas such as equations and ?. A non-logical atomic formula F is considered limit-BHK-correct i it is correct in the ordinary sense. Since asserting a statement means giving a guessing function, we have to de ne guessing functions for F. Since guessing functions are meaningless for this case, we may take any guessing function converging as far as F is correct in the sense of Tarski semantics. The condition on a guessing function g(t) o f a n atomic non-logical formula F is g(t) c o n verges and F holds.
The convergence condition is not very important. We may drop it.
Note that an interpretation of negation :A has not been given. It is understood to bean abbreviation of A ) ?, and its semantics is given by this formula. ? is the atomic formula representing a contradiction such as 0 = 1. By the de nition for atomic formulas, there is no guessing function of the formula ?, which never holds. If A and A ) ? both have guessing functions, then it yields a contradiction. Thus if A ) ? has a guessing function, A does not. If A does not have any guessing function, then any function g(t) is a guessing function A ) ? since the condition becomes vacuously true. Namely, A ) ? is limit-BHK-correct i A cannot have any guessing function.
It would be worth noting that if guessing functions g(x t) are all trivial, i.e. g(x t) = g(x 0), then limit-BHK-interpretation becomes the usual BHKinterpretation of intuitionistic mathematics. Next we consider 0 2 -DNE. Assume ::9x:8y:P(x y) is limit-BHK-correct for a recursive predicate P. Then 9x:8y:P(x y) holds classically and we can de ne a guessing function g converging to such an x as follows:
0 and 1 are projection functions for pairs, i.e., 0 ((x y)) = x and 1 ((x y)) = y. The function h tries to traverse the depth two trees de ned by the branches fhx yi j P(x y)g.
Since a trivial guessing function of 8y:P(x y) is given if 8y:P(x y) is classically true, it is easy to de ne a guessing function k(t) for 9x:8y:P(x y). Thus, 0 2 -DNE is limit-BHK-correct with the guessing function l(x t) de ned by l(x t) = k(t).
Learning in the limit and proof animation
In this section, I will explain why \learning" in the limit would beuseful for proof animation. The contents of this section largely depends on clari cations and suggestions by one of reviewers of the paper.
The semantics described above is based on the notion of \computation in the limit" appeared in 26]. Computation in the limit means that functions are \computable" relative to the halting problem K as an oracle. Such functions are also simply called K-recursive. In this respect, the semantics described in the previous sections can beunderstood in the context of recursion theory.
On the other hand, Gold's model of learning in the limit concerns a limiting process of another type: the learner sees more and more information on an object X and then has to come up with nite information answering the question under investigation. The nite information is a program for X in case of function learning, an enumeration procedure for a set X in the case of learning r.e. languages, an index of a class in the case of classifying some sequences according to a nite or in nite numberof classes.
Although it is possible to interpret our realizability interpretation in pure recursion theoretic framework, it is better to relate it to learning theory and so doing is much more suggestive and productive . A t ypical example which relates learning theory to LCM is the minimum number principle (MNP) \there is an m such that for all n, f(m) f(n) holds", where f is a function from the natural numbers to the natural numbers. It is formalized as follows:
The function f may be regarded as a recursive function, and then the realizability interpretation of this principle maintains that m is obtained by a K-recursive function. But, it is much better to regard f as an input stream in the sense of programming language. An input stream f(0) f (1) : : : is a possibly in nite series of data supplied by the environment w h i c h i s u n c o n trollable and unpredictable. A series of characters input from keyboard is a typical input stream. Then, no one can predict the next value of the input stream. Nonetheless, we can \ nd" the value m attaining the minimum of f(m) by learning in the limit process. We write down zero on a blackboard. When, the next value f(1) comes in from the stream, we compare f(0) on the board with f(1). If f(1) f(0) holds, then we do nothing. If f(0) < f(1) holds, then we erase 0 on the board and write 1. We continue the same process in nitely. Eventually, the number m on the board attains the minimum of the value of the f(m) and stop to change. This is a learning process in the sense of algorithmic learning theory. Actually, this problem of nding m is the same as the classi cation problem of functions with respect to the classes C y = ffjy = m i n ff(x)jx = 0 1 : : : g.
More important yet, learning in the limit is better than K-recursiveness in modelizing the debugging process as Shaprio 25] used learning theory for his algorithmic debugging. Program debugging process is interactive and the input stream f can be considered as ever expanding set of test cases in the sense of xUnit testing framework in 5]. EX-learning is easily modelized by limiting realization of the formula 9e:8x:f(x) = ' e (x), where ' e stands for the recursive function of the index e, and the stream f(0) f (1) : : : , or equivalently, the set f(x f(x))jx = 0 1 : : : g could be regarded as the complete test suite for the program ' e which implements f. 5 Proof animation is a technology for debugging proofs. Since a proof is not a function or a set, there is no complete test suite for a proof. Nonetheless, as the MNP could be interpreted by a learning process, debugging of proofs is naturally modelized by learning process via our realizability i n terpretation. To show how proof animation by learning in the limit is adequate for debugging of proofs, we illustrate an imaginary session of proof animation in the below.
Assume that I was developing a formal proof of a sort of MNP. I de ne a metric on the interval m n] of the set of integers by the distance from n. F or example, the metric of n is 0 and the metric of m is jn ; mj. I introduce a linear order by means of the metric. Thus, n is the smallest element a n d n ; 7 is larger than n ; 3, since their metrics are 7 and 3, respectively.
What I wish to prove is MNP for this ordering:
where f is a function from the natural numbers to the interval and P m n (x y) represent \x is less than or equals to y in the ordering".
The metric of x is formally de ned by jx ; nj. Thus, the formal de nition of P m n (x y) should bejy ; nj j x ; nj. My proof language has the built-in predicate , but does not have a built-in for . So I have to use -sign. Before starting to type in the formal de nition, I felt tired and went to the common room to have a cup of tea. When I returned to the o ce, I began to type in the formal de nition of P m n (x y) a s jx ; nj j y ; nj.
I develop some lemmas and my v ery clever proof checker automatically chose an appropriate mathematical induction and proves the principle (1) from the lemmas. Since the proof checker proved it, we are very sure about the correctness of the principle.
It might bebetter to animate the proof to see what kind of limiting computation process presents in the proof. f may be programmed, but it is easier to input the values of f interactively from the keyboard. Set m = ;2 a n d n = 7 . We input as f(0) = 3.
The tool returns the rst guess \x would be0 and the value f(x) is 3". It's ok. I have given only one date-item to the animator. Thus, it should bethe guess.
Next, I will input f(1) = 7 to see the mind change. But, why the proof checker proved the wrong proposition? No, it did not prove wrong proposition. The two orders of x and y de ned by jx ; nj j y ; nj and jy ; nj j x ; nj are symmetrically isomorphic. The proof checker proved the correct proposition. Only one thing was wrong. The de ned order was not the intended one.
Since the proof checker cannot know the intention in my mind, it could not detect the slip. Only when I interacted with the proof consulting my i n tention, I could nd the gap between the formal de nition and the intention.
Note that the interaction was possible since we use limiting realizability, s i n c e the principle is essentially non-constructively and so the constructive proof animation in 16] is not applicable. Furthermore, learning in the limit naturally modelized the interaction sequence between user and animator.
6 Mind change hierarchy of propositions
In the realizations of semi-classical principles given in section 3, realizers for 
A hierarchy by formal provability
In section 6, we considered the strengths of semi-classical principles via interpretations (semantical hierarchy). There is another kind of hierarchy via derivability (syntactical hierarchy). Hierarchy via derivability i s the one used in proof theoretic studies such as reverse mathematics. Some base systems are xed and logical principles are compared with their strength via these systems. Proof checkers are formal systems implemented on computers. Thus this kind of research is quite important for proof animation. It would show which kind of theorems can be animated by P A/LCM-technology, and which k i n d o f semi-classical principles are appropriate to animate a particular theorem.
We call it calibration of classical principles. The basis of the calibration theory is the syntactical hierarchy of semi-classical principles. The hierarchy of arithmetical semi-classical principles have been determined in 1]. The next step is to classify classical theorems with respect to this hierarchy. Some results have beenalready known. MNP and 0 1 -LEM are provably equivalent in the 6 Every limit of partial functions can be extended to the limit of a total function. However, the limit obtained might not betotal by itself. Thus, we cannot replace partial functions with total functions. standard formal system of rst order intuitionistic arithmetic augmented with a free function variable. A formulation of existence of step functions such as y = x] over real numbers is equivalent to 0 2 -LEM. Toftdal 29] has given some elaborated calibration results in analysis and Berardi 7] has given some calibration results for 
Weak K onig Lemma, LLPO and Popperian game
In the syntactic hierarchy of LCM principles, Weak K onig Lemma, abbreviated to WKL, is especially interesting. WKL is a theorem for binary tree:
Any binary-branching tree with in nite many nodes has an in nite path.
Harvey Friedman found that this principle is logically as weak as Hilbert's nite standpoint in a certain logical environment b u t proves many important mathematical theorems such as the completeness theorem of rst order predicate logic. On this unexpected nding, Simpson and his colleagues developed an interesting theory of \reverse mathematics" 28]. They calibrated mathematical theorems by means of WKL or the like. For example, they calibrate which theorem is proved by WKL and WKL is necessary to prove it.
After the low basis theorem and results of reverse mathematics, Ishihara and Kohlenbach pointed out that WKL would be important in LCM as well. They and Berardi, Yamazaki and Hayashi jointly found some interesting relationships between WKL and Lesser Limited Principles of Omniscience (LLPO), a principle in constructive mathematics, and the position of WKL in LCM hierarchy.
The syntactical hierarchy of LCM including WKL was very similar to the one of reverse mathematics. Although our hierarchy is ner than the one of reverse mathematics, many techniques developed in reverse mathematics were quite useful to investigate our syntactical hierarchy. 7 After the works, I raised an open problem to nd a learning theoretic framework that corresponds to this weak classical principle in the proceedings version of the present paper 17]. An unexpected solution was found very soon after sending the manuscript to the editor. It turned out that a series of realizability i n terpretations coined by Lifschitz 20] and extended by v an Oosten 23] is the right framework to represent logical aspect of WKL. Although Lifschitz and van Oosten were unaware of learning theoretic aspects of their works, it is straightforward to give a learning theoretic framework corresponding to their interpretation.
The underlying idea of our learning theoretic framework resembles the philosopher Karl Popper's \falsi ability" or \refutability", e.g., 24]. Popper claimed that a theory is scienti c only when it is clearly refuatble by a counterexample. A theory refuted by a counterexample drops and the other theories survive. By such selection with refutation, science evolves and converges to the truth.
We formulate Popper's idea in an algorithmic way. We assume that some theories are competing in a game to predict the value of a given scienti c constant. We restrict ourselves algorithmically. I t means that realistic things must be computable relative to observations. The observations can be modeled as an oracle. We consider only functions and reals etc. recursive relative t o t h e oracle.
Thus a scienti c constant is a recursive real number relative to the oracle. Each theory has its hypotheses by which the constant value is logically predicted. We assume that every theory is algorithmically scienti c in Popperian sense, namely, e v ery hypothesis is 0 1 -sentence, which is the only formulas refutable algorithmically. S i n c e a theory has only nitely many hypotheses, we regard a theory as the conjunction of these 0 1 -sentences. Thus a theory itself is a 0 1 -sentence. By formalizing the situation, we have a framework which I call 7 The axiom of ACA 0 of reverse mathematics represents the entire arithmetical hierarchy, i.e. the union of 0 (n) for all n. On the other hand, 0 n -LEM represents only 0 (n) .
Popperian game.
A Popperian game is a nite set of players f(a 1 P 1 (x 1 )) : : : (a n P n (x n ))g. Each player is modeled by a pair of predicted value a i and its background theory P i (x i ). A theory P i (x i ) is a predicate recursive relative to the oracle, which is interpreted as the 0 1 -proposition 8x i :P i (x i ). If P i is refuted by a counterexample u such t h a t P i (u) is false, then the player (a i P i ) looses and drops from the game. It is possible that more than one player win. Even none may win, since the game is continued even when only one player remains. Even if all other theories are refuted and only one theory remains, the theory remained may b e incorrect.
The set of winners of a Popperian game S = f(a 1 P 1 (x 1 )) : : : (a n P n (x n ))g is de ned by f(a i P i (x i ))j8x i :P i (x i ) holdsg and is denoted as Win(S). The set of winning values is de ned by fa i j(a i P i (x i )) 2 Win(S)g and is denoted by
WV(S).
A system of multivalued functions is de ned by means of Popperian game after Lifschitz realizability 2 0 ] . A multivalued function over natural numbers is a function from the set of natural numbers to the set of nite sets of natural numbers. A multivalued function f is PG-computable or Popperian gamecomputable, if there is a function g recursive relative to the oracle such that g(x) is a code of a Popperian game f(a x 1 P x 1 (x 1 )) : : : (a x n P x n (x n ))g de ned for x and f(x) = WV(g(x)) holds.
Lifschitz and van Oosten realizability interpretations can be reconstructed as realizability i n terpretations by PG-computable multivalued (partial) functions. 8 The logical (or set theoretical) principle embodying the notion of Popperian game (or PG-computability) is WKL in the following form: 8f: (T is an in nite binary tree recursive in f ) 9 g:(g is an in nite path of T)) This scheme is realizable by realizability i n terpretations with PG-computable functions.
The important point is that we can apply the same principle again to trees constructed recursively in the path g just as in the usual logic. This is the di erence from the other LCM principles such as 0 1 -LEM, which cannot be applied repeatedly. 8 Note that the oracle is not essential for their original cases. The only reason for using the oracle is to make the Popperian game more natural from the viewpoints of learning theory and discovery science.
LCM-WKL is intuitionistically equivalent to \ These ultra weak laws of excluded middle are yet adequate to prove many important theorems constructively, e.g., the completeness theorem of predicate logic. This fact remarkably resembles reverse mathematics 28]. Actually, proofs of corresponding results in reverse mathematics go through in LCM without almost any changes.
A classical formal system WKL 0 of Weak K onig Lemma in reverse mathematics has a countable model which has only countably many sets coded by a low set. 9 Another realizability i n terpretation which realizes these weak LCM principles can be obtained by the standard Kleene realizability i n terpretation by means of partial functions recursive in the countable model.
A game semantics
One of the origins of LCM was Berardi's approximation interpretation of classical logic 8]. Berardi's interpretation was motivated by Coquand's game semantics for classical logic 12]. Thus, it is natural that there are some relationships between Coquand's game semantics and LCM semantics. One of the reviewers of the present paper, who is perhaps unaware of Coquand's game semantics, outlined a game semantics with mind changes and asked me if the semantics or alike is equivalent to LCM for the prenex normal forms. The mind change rule and convergence criteria that the reviewer gave were not clear. Thus, we understood it as Coquand's semantics. Coquand The restricted rule is more natural than the one given in 12] from the game theoretic point of view. It is likely that this game semantics is a key to better understanding of LCM semantics, and it would give a better proof animation methodology. Here, I brie y report the semantics as an answer to the reviewer. This is a joint work with Thierry Coquand and Stefano Berardi, and we are still working on its details.
In game semantics, e.g., 12], only positive formulas are considered. A formula is positive i it is built up from atomic formulas for recursive predicates with only 8, 9, _ and^. In the standard game semantics of logic, formulas are in nitary propositional formulas with in nite or nite disjunctions and conjunctions as connectives. It is easy to map positive formulas of rst order arithmetic to such in nitary propositional formulas. Since LCM semantics is not de ned for such in nitary formulas, we consider only positive formulas of arithmetic. Furthermore, positive formulas are constructively transformed to prenex formulas. For example, consider a generic instance of 0 2 -LEM 9x:8y:T(e x y) _ 8 a:9b:T ; (e a b) (2) where T is the Kleene's T-predicate and T ; is an atomic formula representing the negation of T. This is equivalent in HA (Heyting Arithmetic The rst order formal system of intuitionistic arithmetic) to the following prenex formula: 9x:8a:9b:8y:((x > 0^T (e x ; 1 y )) _ (x = 0 T ; (e a b)): (3) It is easy to transform any positive formula to a prenex normal form in a similar way. We consider only prenex formulas below.
We brie y explain Coquand's game semantics with deep mind changes (backtracking) developed in 12]. A game on a prenex formula is played by two players Eloise and Abelard. We illustrate the game by an example 9x 1 :8y 1 :9x 2 :8y 2 :x 1 + y 1 x 2 + y 2 :
Eloise is supposed to give a witness for existential quanti er, 9x 1 and 9x 2 .
Abelard is supposed to give a witness for universal quanti er, 8y 1 and 8y 2 .
Since the outermost quanti er is 9x 1 
g at the innermost atomic formula. Now, it is 7 + 11 18 + 4. Since this is true, Eloise wins. If she had played x 2 = 17, Abelard could play y 2 = 0 to make the formula false 7 + 1 1 1 7 + 0 . Then, Eloise loses and Abelard wins. Note that Eloise has a winning strategy taking x 2 = x 1 + y 1 . We suppose that all moves executed are recorded and the both players can review them anytime. This is the standard notion of games associated to prenex formulas. It is easy to see that Eloise has a recursive winning strategy i the formula of the game is recursively realizable in Kleene's sense.
Coquand extended this notion of game to classical logic. In Coquand semantics, Abelard plays just as in the game described above, but Eloise is allowed to change mind. She is allowed to go back to any point in the game so far played. We may assume that all the moves are recorded on a piece of paper in the chronological order. Eloise may c hange her mind on her turn. She may ush the current status of the play and reset it to a past status of the play. For example, suppose that she mistakenly moved as x 2 = 1 in the above play and Abelard moved as y 2 = 0 and won. When she noticed her loss, she may backtrack to the position of her move for x 2 and say x 2 = 18. Then she can win. This backtrack is also recorded on the paper.
It is known that a prenex formula is classically valid i it has a recursive strategy in the games with backtracking. I describe a winning strategy for 0 2 -LEM (3) given above. Below, Abelard will be denoted by 8 and Eloise will be denoted by 9. A round in which 9 moves with x = 11 and 8 moves with a = 8 will be denoted by x = 11 a = 8] . A status of a play is a nite sequence of rounds and will be denoted as \ x = 0 a = 3] 9's move b = 1 is a dummy. After this, we have t wo cases. If T(e A 1 A 3 ) i s true, then 9 wins and 9 stops the play. If it's false, 9 backtracks to u 1 and continues to play as follows: See 12] for details.
As we have seen, Coquand's game validates more than LCM. The formula (3) is not realizable by limiting functions, since 0 2 -function cannot decide the universal 0 2 -formula 9x:8y:T(e x y). Thus, the game semantics with the full backtracks does not characterize LCM semantics. However, when backtracks are restricted to simple backtracks, the game semantics coincides with LCM semantics.
Recall that a play with backtracking was a nite sequence of status u 0 u 1 u 2 : : : , where the condition u n+1 is obtained from one of u i (i < n ) b y adding a round is met. We restrict the backtrack points to the substatus of u n , i.e., u n+1 is obtained from one of u i (i < n) by adding a round, and such a u i must be a substatus of u n .
Status S 1 is a substatus of status S 2 i S 1 is a segment of S 2 . Namely, S 1 is obtained from S 2 by \popping up" some rounds from the tail. Thus, a more natural equivalent de nition is A play with simple backtracking consists of a nite sequence of statuses u 0 u 1 u 2 : : : starting with the empty status. u n+1 is obtained from a substatus of u n by adding a round.
The original game in 12] has a quite complicated form of backtracking: if we think of the game as a debate, Eloise can not only change her mind, but also resume a previous position in the discussion that she had given up for a while. This complicated behavior is precisely what is forbidden in the simple backtracking.
A game consisting of plays with simple backtracks is called a simple game. Observe that the strategy for (3) backtracks from the status u 3 \ x = A 1 + 1 a = A 2 ] b = 1 y = A 3 ]" to the status u 1 \ x = 0 a = A 1 ]", which is not a substatus of u 3 . It is a deep backtracking not allowed in simple games.
Actually, w e can prove for any prenex normal formula that there is a recursive winning strategy of simple game for 9 i the formula is realizable by the LCM-realizability i n terpretation, which is given in the appendix.
Conclusion
Researches of LCM has begun recently. There are still plenty of problems to be solved. LCM is a mathematics of approximation in a very wide sense including identi cation in the limit. In practical mathematics, some kinds of approximations are inevitable. We are trying to relate LCM to practical mathematics like numerical analysis and computer algebra. Theories and techniques developed in learning theory must bevery useful and indispensable in these researches.
Investigations of links between learning theory, r e v erse mathematics and LCM must befruitful to understand the relationship between learning theory and LCM. There are some interesting resemblances between these three. It has been shown that the ideals of the polynomial ring over the rationals in n variables is EX-learnable with mind change bound ! n but not less than ! n 27]. In reverse mathematics, Hilbert nite basis theorem for the same polynomial rings for all n is equivalent to trans nite induction up to ! ! 28] . In LCM, the same theorem is proved by n-fold induction and 0 1 -LEM, which lead to ! n mind change in Ershov's sense. Are there any formal relationships between these areas by which these resemblances are clearly explained?
Another challenging problem is to nd logics corresponding to the other paradigms of learning theory such as PAC-learning. PAC-learning does not straightforwardly correspond to the standard logic. A logic of PAC-learning will be a kind of probabilistic logic.
It is known that Logic of discovery 4] by Bardzins, Freivalds, and Smith resembles LCM at the lower level of hierarchy. Are there any deeper relationships between them?
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In this appendix, a Kleene style realizability for rst order LCM and a modi ed realizability for LCM are given. A realizability similar to the Kleene style realizability has been given in 21]. The one given here is designed in a little bit more learning theoretic way and closer to Berardi's limit-semantic 9].
It should be noted that if guessing functions g(x t) are all trivial, i.e. g(x t) = g(x 0), then the realizabilities given below turn to realizability o f i n tuitionistic logic. Then realizers are computable (partial) functions.
A.1 Kleene style limit-realizability
We give a Kleene style limit-realizability i n terpretation. In this approach, we regard guessing functions as their indices. Thus we assume an acceptable programming system or an acceptable system of indices of partial recursive f u n ctions (see 22] ). We assume a standard coding of nite sequences of numbers and write, e.g., (a 1 : : : a n ) for the code of the sequences a 1 : : : a n . A pair is regarded as a sequence with two elements. i is a computable function retrieving i-th element of sequence as a code. An index of n-ary function f(x 1 ::: x n ) i s regarded as an index of 1-ary function f 0 such a s f 0 ((x 1 : : : x n )) = f(x 1 : : : x n ). We x an algorithm to compute p from q, r so that p (x) = ( q (x) r (x)). p is called the standard paring index of the indices q and r. Although it is not necessary, it make things easier to assume q and r are computable from p. W e assume it here. Let A 1 ::: A n B beformulas of rst order arithmetic and let x 1 ::: x m bea nite sequence of variables including all free variables of the n + 1 formulas. Furthermore, r 1 : : : r n is a sequence of fresh n-variables. A tuple x 1 ::: x m A 1 : : : A n r 1 : : : r n B ] is called a formula with context. x 1 : : : x m A 1 : : : A n r 1 : : : r n ] is called context and B is called body. We denote the context by ; and a formula with context as ; B ]. These notions are borrowed from type theory. T h e y are not really necessary for our de nition but make things much clearer.
We de ne a rst order condition \r r ; B ]" for each formula with context ; B ]. (r is a new free variable.) Although we will de ne it in English, it can beformalized by a rst order arithmetical formula including function symbol for of the index system. The de nition of realization is done by cases on B using an induction over the complexity de ned as the sum of the logical signs in A 1 A n and B. In the de nition, we intend r to be index of m + n + 1-ary total recursive guessing function g(x 1 ::: x m r 1 : : : r n t ) of B. Thus, we may regard it as a condition de ning \guessing function of B". We will list the de nition of realization below. We say context is realized when r i r x 1 x m A i ] holds for i = 1 : : : n .
A.1.1 Case 1: B is an atomic formula: r is an index of a total recursive function and r (x 1 : : : x m r 1 : : : r n t ) converges whenever the context is realized. Without loss of generality, w e m a y assume guessing functions of 8x:A(x) and A ) B are trivial. Namely, g(x 0) = g(x t) for all t. Let us assume g be a guessing function of 8x:A(x). lim t g(x t) converges to an index of guessing function for A(x). To realize A, w e compute two nested limits lim t limt g(x t) (t).
It is equivalent to a single limit lim t g(x t) (t). Let h be a recursive function such that h (x)(t) = g(x t) (t). Then g 0 de ned by g 0 (x t) = h(x) can replace g.
The realizability given here is di erent from the one given in 21] in two respects. The realizability in 21] is based on an axiomatic recursion theory BRFT. Here, acceptable programming systems are used instead. Since acceptable programming systems may have dynamic complexity measures, the problem of limits of partial guessing functions in 21] does not arise. A limit BRFT system whose guessing functions are restricted to total functions can be de ned for any BRFT with Blum's dynamic complexity measure (c.f. Lemma 1.1, 11]). Thus, we assumed guessing functions are total as usual.
The other di erence is the points where limit are evaluated. As noted above, guessing functions for implication and universal formulas could be trivial. This is not so in 21]. On the other hand, guessing realizer of 9x:A was de ned so that it includes the value of x. A guessing realizer g of 8x:9y :A(x y) in this paper, may return in the limit an index of a guessing function h of 9y :A(x y) for input x. T h us evaluation of limit to retrieve y could be postponed till the limit of h is evaluated. On the other hand, in 21], g was assumed to return a natural numbery itself instead of its guessing function h. Thus, g could not avoid evaluation of limit and g could not be trivial in general.
Berardi introduced a semantics based on limit-natural numbers 9]. Limitnatural numbers N are 0-ary guessing functions converging to natural numbers. From classical point of view, N is isomorphic to the standard natural numbers N. However there is no recursive isomorphism form N to N. In this sense, they di er. Berardi has developed constructive theory of nonconstructive functions using this trick. The guessing functions of formulas with empty context can be regarded as Berardi's limit-natural numbers. In this respect, ours interpretation may b e thought a non-standard semantics of numbertheory with limit-numbers.
